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WHO CAN BEST JUDGE THE JUDGES*
Roger J. Traynort

V

be puzzled by so
sometimes
must
states,
of
the mother
antic
an offspring
as California. Hence I bring you reassuring
IRGINIA,

word that when California is good, despite its massive growing pains, it
is very, very good. In recent years it has developed an outstanding
system of courts in which judges can work with impartiality and independence, keeping their distance from the popular or powerful influences that chronically beset legislatures.
We can be grateful for such judges and still recognize that even the
best of them are as much in need of responsible critics as anyone else.
In addressing myself to the question of who can best judge the judges,
I shall in due course report on how California has confronted the question. First, however, by way of obtaining a perspective on how judiciously people are apt to judge the judges at the ballot box, we might
consider how judiciously people judge their fellows outside the courtroom.
Assume, as we like to do in the law, that you are newly arrived in
a faraway land to conduct operations for the Old Caution Company,
a national firm engaged in excavating tar pits and recreating them in
panorama for museums. You lease a tar pit of great speculative interest.
Excavations all around reveal masses of tar, oozing with fragments of
prehistoric animals as well as oil.
In no time you confront fractious problems of judgment. The
neighboring tar pit owners are confounding the din of their excavations
with earsplitting sound trucks to attract the tourist trade. You complain to Old Caution's local lawyer that they are battering your delicate decibel system, adding that there ought to be a law.
"There is," he responds. "The trouble is that your neighbors see
nothing wrong with uncivil behavior when those sound trucks are
bringing in so much tourist money."
*Address delivered at the Midwinter Meeting of the Virginia State Bar Association
at Williamsburg, Virginia on February 10, 1967. Chief Justice Traynor wvas elected an
honorary life member of the Association in appreciation for the part he played in the
meeting.
tChief Justice of the California Supreme Court. A.B. 1923, Ph.D., J.D. 1927. University of California.
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"There must be others whose ears are splitting," you venture. "We
can join forces to make ourselves heard."
"You ignore," says Old Caution's lawyer, "that your small voices
will be outnumbered. Your neighbors have the money to mold public
opinion, and they have done so. If you took a poll today, you might
be surprised to learn how many people associate that racket with a
booming economy and not with assault and battery."
"It is time you learned,." the lawyer continues, "that we call such an
opinion the will of the people, whether it be molded by a mob majority, a mob minority or some ill-willed clod broadcasting crudely
alloyed vilifications from an arcane lily pad. There is only one thing
left to do: test the matter in court."
You do go to court, and the judgment is in your favor. Then comes
an unexpected sequel. Gaudy circulars suddenly appear everywhere,
purportedly as expos6s of the laws governing noise, though actually
their target is Old Caution's lawyer. They charge that he advanced
against the constitution as it stood until the Year of the Last Great
Horsecar. They charge that he instigated the proceedings that led to
the deplorable decision against sound trucks' in the face of a long line
of sound precedents upholding the clangor of doorbell ringers. 2 They
declare that the founding fathers would have left some express way
open for lowering the boom on sound trucks had they deemed it in the
best interests of the people.
The circulars are anonymous, bearing only the fictitious name: The
People's Will. No one seems to know:
Who is Willy
What is he?
Who spends so freely
And anonymously.
You envisage the recipients of the far-flung diatribes-the sober citizens and the loons, hurried or harried, with no more than a weary or
blurry eye for XWilly's concoctions. You deem it well that they still
' Se e Kovacs v. Coop er, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) .
2 See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); cf. Marsh
v. Alabama, 326 U.S.
501 (1946). See also Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S.
418 (1943); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. City of Griffin,
303 U.S. 444 (1938).
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have no power to vote Old Caution's lawyer out of his private office.
The people are skilled to do many things, you think, but hardly to
pass judgment on lawyers and on matters of constitutional law on the
basis of anonymous handbills.
So ends your first lesson in judgment. You will call upon anyone
presuming to judge others to justify his judgment by something more
than the irresponsible words of nefarious or nilly Willies.
You turn back to the excavations you have undertaken for Old Caution. Suddenly the company geologist comes upon a field mouse, clearly
a creature of the soaring sixties, embedded in tar on the rough tracery
of a dire wolf, clearly done in by the ages.
"Fantastic!" he exclaims. "Nobody will ever believe it."
Nobody does.
Following the geologist's announcement of the find, Forbes quips
that good things may come in small packages, but not on the back of
a dire wolf. The Wall Street Journal comments that even in an age of
conglomerate mergers, Old Caution's story stretches the imagination.
Security analysts join in a blanket judgment that Old Caution is not
what it used to be, despite its long and unimpeachable record of sound
management and growth.
You reflect that men of affairs, however sound in their own business
judgments, tend to be less so in outside fields. The findings of a geologist, you conclude, are not judged best by those who know nothing of
geology.
So ends your second lesson in judgment. You will call upon anyone
presuming to judge others not only to justify his judgment by something more than the irresponsible words of Willy, but also to present
some qualifications of his own for passing judgment.
Once again you go back to your diggings and call in the artist-inresidence to depict the scene for a gift to the community. She creates
a colorful abstraction that evokes, for some who see it, an underground
landscape of fallen trees and one frail human figure reaching out toward
a shaft of sunlight pocked with smoke. The caption reads: is Excelsior
Worth it?

The Excelsior painting, along with others, is displayed in the local
museum, to be judged by leading citizens. The judges include an expert on the tax advantages of losses in a swimming pool of interests, a
management consultant who thrives on bankruptcies and a native lady
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who has collected miniatures for so long that she is known as Miss
Minnie.
Miss Minnie makes a public statement that, in all fairness to the
artist, it is best to remove the work from the list of entries without
further ado. She adds that her colleagues agree with her considered
judgment that the presentation of an abstraction like Excelsior, in a
world which is in sore need of concrete works, casts doubts upon the
values of the company sponsoring it.3
Old Caution's president, who is not a dropout from the Harvard
Business School for nothing, issues a statement that in his considered
judgment somebody could serve humanity by collecting Miss Minnie
and depositing her in the nearest trash can before she utters any more
puny judgments or draws any more giant inferences. She shouts back
that in the name of freedom she will enlist the people on her side to
judge Excelsior, and for that matter, Old Caution, by the standards of
the people.
You record the fracas as your third lesson in judgment. You will call
upon anyone presuming to judge others not only to justify his judgment by something more than the irresponsible words of Willy, not
only to present his own qualifications, but also to prove himself free
from provincial or partisan notions and free from emotional bias.
The people Miss Minnie sets out to mobilize are, as usual, all at the
ball game. Left to themselves, Miss Minnie and Old Caution's president
blow up a storm that at last lands them both in court. From now on
it is an authentic judge who will be doing the judging; from now on
our eyes are on him. What he determines may reach beyond the
people before him and leave its mark on the law. Is he better qualified
8 An alternative version submitted by the artist also encountered the wrath of Miss
Minnie, despite its relative concreteness. This painting depicts a half-upright, sabled
dire wolf, nameless and faceless except for one blear eye in its bony head, sinking in
tar which is patterned with flaming pots. Within reach of its outstretched forelimbs is
a small, half-upright human being with a bewildered face, his forehead tarred with
the name: Uomo Sapiente, ma non troppo. If he stays put, his name is mud. A steep
slab of rock, stabbed with sunlight pocked with smoke, affords him a perilous escape.
Far up on a spreading cumulus cloud there is eminent a tar pot steaming up smudge
bubbles, tended by a pair of cross-eyed, dog-cared, flaming, grim wolves precariously
poised toward the edge of their float.
Miss Minnie, after vehemently objecting to the somber tonality, singular luminosity
and dual fields of vision in the work, voices the nub of her criticism: "Certainly we
are all opposed to darkness, but there is implicit in this work a reluctance to join
forces with all that has gone before, and at the same time a certain disturbing skepticism about our kind of sunshine."
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than any other man in the street to be the judge? And who is the best
judge of him?
I find the first question easier than the second. I do not suppose
that the average judge is necessarily a better man than the average man
in the street or at the ball game. The chances may be no more than
one in a million that he is a genius, or one in a thousand that he is extraordinarily competent, or one in a hundred that he has much more
than ordinary intelligence. He cannot always be so bright or sensitive
as the people who appear before him. Only rarely can he be as well
versed in special fields as the specialists. Nevertheless, I think that by
training and tradition he is more likely than not to do a better job of
judging than even the specialists, and those odds are good enough for
me. The law itself, which deals mainly with probabilities, in the main
requires of a lawyer only that he prove his case to be more probable
than not.4
You may agree that the odds favor the judges if you put two tests
to yourself. First, each of you, and particularly any of you disposed
to be impatient with judges, should imagine yourself before the court
and then ask by whom you would want to be judged. Would your
choice be your best friend, who thinks judges should be voted out of
office whenever they render an unpopular decision? Would it be your
neighbors, who have the most remarkable judgment except as to bringing up their children? Would it be your favorite cousin, who is a dear,
but who has long been suffering from hardening of the mind as well
as of the arteries? Vould it be Villy or Miss Minnie? Would it be
Old Caution's president, who is not about to give any weight to your
side of the case in an automobile accident suit when he knows for a
fact that you are the worst driver in town and obviously deserved what
hit you? Would the judge of your choice even be Old Caution's lawyer,
a man skilled in advocacy and counselling? Could you be sure that
without judicial experience-that hard-learned lesson on how little anyone knows of total human experience-the lawyer would promptly
quit himself of views developed from his practice? As you review all
these alternatives, you may find yourself thinking better of actual

judges.
In the second test, imagine yourself in the courtroom again, but this
time as a judge who has just taken the oath of office. The very cere4 See Traynor, Fact Skepticism and the Judicial Process, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 635, 636
(1958).
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mony is likely to work a change in you. Henceforth you are not likely
to pass judgment on your fellows, not even on judges, as easily as you
did by your fireside. The oath of office calls upon you to sacrifice the
comfort of a closed mind.
If you are in a trial court you soon learn that each new case before
you is there because there is something to be said for each side. Rarely
is it clear at the outset which side is more probably right than not, and
sometimes the disputing parties do little to make the issues any clearer.
It is your job to listen intently for the sound of truth in the adversary
presentations. But who can know for sure where the truth lies? In
your daily life do you always know? It is still harder to know as a
judge, when you are confined to the facts before you. As you imagine
yourself in that role, you may once again grow more understanding of
judges.
If you are in an appellate court, there is usually still more to be said
for each side. In each new case you must decide how the law applies
to the facts that have been decided at the trial. I have described elsewhere how hard is this seemingly quiet task:
Once the adversary shouting has died down and the court is left
with the echoes and the pro briefs and the con briefs, it is unhappily
mindful of the maxim that solemnly places it above the battle in which
it is about to become the deciding factor. A judge assigned to write
the opinion in a hard case looks up one morning from his desk to
receive the record. Often it closes in on him in gigantesque bundles.
Once in a while it is encased in a deceptively slender fagot of papers
that slides onto his desk without casting a shadow beforehand. Perforce he looks from the instant case to the calendar and reckons how
best to budget for it from finite time and resources.
He wagers time for the latest intruder against the relentlessly moving clock, knowing that he must work with intense concentration
against it to absorb the record as well as the briefs of lawyers who
have deliberated the selected facts. He can only hope that the adversaries have been of sufficiently high mind to assemble enough pieces
of the complicated puzzle in enough order to enable him to perceive
something of its contours and inner patterns. However perceptively
he puts the puzzle together, he will be constrained by the number
and arrangement of the pieces that each adversary has litigated in the
trial court.5
6Traynor, La Rude Vita, La Dolce Giustizia; Or Hard Cases Can Make Good Law,
29 U. Cm. L. REV. 223, 225-26 (1962).
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The judge has no choice but to decide the cases before him, even
when he might prefer to see them decided out of court. He has no
power to step out from the courthouse to tell people what they should
litigate and what they should not.
He knows that he can rarely be more than fifty per cent popular in
the courtroom, where the elation of parties who win their cases is
matched by the often bitter disappointment of the losers. He is also
disposed to be philosophic about his indifferent chances for popularity
with the fickle public; he can be as tolerant of their flightiness on questions of law as of other frailties. He knows how few people know
anything more about law than what they read in headlines or in capsule
reports, and how often these are garbled. For all his tolerance he may
reflect with sadness that even people steeped in a democratic tradition
are prone to grow heedless of their great heritage of law.
Perhaps no one is better situated to appreciate that heritage, or less in
need of history lessons about it, than a Virginian. Nonetheless it may be
useful to recall a little history about judges before we come to a final
answer on who can best judge the judges.
For centuries there was no such thing as a separate and independent
judiciary in England. Before the seventeenth century judges were creatures of the king, holding office at his pleasure and subject to instant dismissal if they rendered a decision that displeased him. When he died, out
of office they went, to be replaced by creatures of the new king. Job
security was unheard of, let alone independence of mind. The judge
most likely to succeed was the one best able to guess what the king expected of him. It is hardly a wonder that judicial corruption grew
rampant.6
The wonder is that despite the forbidding aspect of concentrated
kingly power, men risked their lives against it. When the Stuarts came
to the throne, ringing one variation after another on the divine right
of kings, there was a growing mutter of rebellion. In the courts the
judges were developing an institutional personality larger than the sum
of their individual personalities. With tenuous authority they were
beginning to disagree with the divine and absolute monarch. Three
times Sir Edward Coke managed such disagreement before James I
dismissed him.7
E. HAYNES, THE SELECTION

TENURE OF JUDGEs 51-55 (1944); Graham, Historical Independence of the Judiciary, 14 N.DL. REv. 71 (1937); Hyde, Judges: Their
Selection and Tenure, 22 N.Y.U.L. REV. 389 (1947).
7 See E. HAYNES, supra note 6, at 55-58.
* See

AND
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The muttering of the people became a rumble, and the resistance of
the judges to the king became a trend, culminating in the reforms of
the late seventeenth century. The Long Parliament, which Charles I was
compelled to convene in 1640, demanded that judges be secure in office
during good behavior. This demand was symptomatic of the struggle
for separation of powers, and it grew vociferous when Cromwell and
Charles II removed judges at will to maintain a loyal court. In 1680
Parliament again petitioned the king, Charles II, for judicial tenure, but
it took the Revolution of 1688 and the fall of the Stuarts to bring about
the Act of Settlement of 1701, which established tenure during good
behavior. Henceforth a judge who not only behaved himself but also
behaved like an independent judge was entitled to stay on the job.
The long struggle in England was not lost on the American colonists.
Article III of the United States Constitution provides for life tenure and
irreducible salaries for the federal judiciary, except in cases warranting
impeachment. Moreover, the events from 1775 to 1790 convinced the
colonists that an unchecked legislature was potentially as tyrannical as
an unchecked king.8 Such men as John Adams and James Madison were
as much on guard against elective despotism as executive despotism.
Hence they limited representative government by adopting the Bill of
Rights, to be interpreted by the courts. In fine eighteenth century
phrases Alexander Hamilton envisaged a judiciary that would
guard the Constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects
of those ill humors which the arts of designing men, or the influence
of particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among the people
themselves, and which, though they speedily give place to better information, and more deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in the
meantime, to occasion dangerous innovations in the government, and
serious oppressions of the minor party in the community.9
Whatever their old-fashioned ring, these prophetic words are more
timely than ever today, when the new arts of designing men and the
influence of particular conjunctures combine to foment ill humors of
such magnitude as to menace goverment itself.
The Supreme Court lost little time in establishing itself as the guardian
of the Constitution. It is bringing live coals to Newcastle to recall
8 See Sharp, The Classical American Doctrine of "The Separation of Powers," 2 U.
Cm. L. REV. 385, 393 (1935).
9 THEFEDERALIST No. 78, at 487-88 (H. Lodge ed. 1888) (Hamilton).
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Afarbury v. Madisono in Virginia. Chief Justice Marshall's pronouncement that the Court had power to adjudge the constitutionality of legislation, though stated in narrow terms, engendered much the same heated
controversy in its day as recurring decisions on constitutionality generate
in our own time. The precedent of a judicial check upon the legislature
was destined to become entrenched across the country, in state as well
as in federal courts, but it also generated a dialogue on the judicial
power that has not abated in our time.
Separation of powers is more easily said than done, but it was done
early in the Republic. There are always indigenous complications,
however, which usually are long in the brewing. The first complication
of separate judicial power developed around the very problem of who
can best judge the judges. I shall note here only the major events that
spawned what we now call Jacksonian Democracy-a movement which
changed the environment, if not the outward forms of our courts,
primarily by giving top priority to popularity as a judicial qualification.
It was natural enough after the Revolution for many to recall with
less than kindness that the most prominent members of the bar had been
Loyalists. Moreover, postwar debt collections did not endear lawyers,
entrusted with these collections, to debtor farmers and businessmen.
This incipient hostility fed upon another complex of circumstances.
Common-law precedents emanating from England were not always
adaptable to new soil, and at the same time there was no historic fund
of American common-law precedents. From the beginning, therefore,
American judges were compelled to play a far more creative role in the
law than their British contemporaries.
Some diehards may have yearned for a distant place with comfortable
precedents as old as the hills. Most Americans, however, accepted the
reality that judges had to forge their way through a legal wilderness
comparable to the actual one westward. They proceeded from that
premise, however, to one of those curious extensions that is the despair
of logicians. If our judges must perforce be creative when there are no
adequate precedents, they speculated, then they are lawmakers no less
than the legislators, and the more so because of Marbury v. Madison.
If that is so, then they too should be answerable to the popular will, that
will-o'-the-wvisp blown about by the most vocal Willies or Miss Minnies
of each fleeting day. The rallying cry would no longer be "Fiat lux!"

but "Fiat ignis fatuus!"
10 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)

137 (1803).
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Few noticed the missing links in such thinking. First, judges have
no power to interpret the law, let alone make it, except as cases come
before them, and even then their interpretation is severely bounded by
the case itself and by the common law. They are not at all free to make
law as the legislature makes it. Second, their decisions are subject to
revision or cancellation by legislation so long as it keeps within constitutional bounds. Likewise, few noticed the dangers of hooking up
courts to the popular will. Such a hookup would militate against the
people themselves by vitiating the independence and impartiality of
judges. Worse still, it would bar the way to rational measures for assuring responsibility in judicial office.
Reason is of little avail, however, when the stars are fixed in their
course. They were fixed on the course toward popular, and hence
poplarly elected, judges, for there was still another influence working
in that direction. The revolutionary political philosophy that swept
through Europe in the first half of the nineteenth century had its effect
in this country, too. If all men are created equal, said facile philosophers,
then it follows that all men are equal in every respect. Few realized
the madness in this methodical leap to an unforegone conclusion by those
who failed to see the trees for the forest. It had taken centuries for men
to realize the importance of protecting each individual tree by regulations that would safeguard it against the wild-swinging axes of nilly
Willies, who sometimes wore crowns. Now the Willies, sometimes
wearing raccoon caps, were intent on cutting individuals down to size
again, and all to the same size, like the endless twins in a paper pattern.
Not many suggested that a blacksmith could bind up a wound as
skillfully as a doctor, or that a doctor could shoe a horse as skillfully as a
blacksmith. Instead, the axe swingers concentrated their efforts on men
in government, whose duties were merely to keep the states united,
get on with a few explorations, maintaining public order at home and
while away any spare time with foreign-policy chores. Such odd jobs
were presumably suitable for Everyman, regardless of his qualifications.
During the heyday for the popular man in public office the courts
long remained immune from popular assault. For some seventy-five
years of our early history practically all state, as well as federal, judges
were appointed with tenure assured during good behavior.1 1 Nevertheless, they became increasingly vulnerable to criticism that, as in our
14-16 (1955); Nelson, Variations on a Theme-Selection and Tenure of Judges, 36 S. CAL. L. REV. 4, 14-17 (1962).
11

See A.
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own time, ranged from the most responsible reasoning to the most irresponsible ranting.
President Jackson's first inaugural address set the tone of the new
day. Nurtured in the philosophy that all men are in fact equal, he soon
proceeded to the corollary that they were as fungible in public office
as potatoes. It was but a short step to selection of judges by the masses,
and between 1846 and 1866 a majority of states took that step. Only
the difficulty of amending the Constitution saved the federal judiciary
from also being staffed henceforth by Willies and Miss Minnies.
In 1889 Lord Bryce commented that popular elections, short terms
and small salaries all worked to lower the character of the judiciary in
the United States.12 He deplored the political character of elections,
which sometimes entailed even election frauds. He also deplored the
timidity, and sometimes even venality, these elections induced in judges.
Later critics documented the severe losses of judicial manpower that
resulted from short terms. Roscoe Pound, emphasizing that continuity
and length of service are important factors contributing to an able judiciary, noted: "It is significant that the twelve outstanding judges in
American judicial history each served at least a quarter of a century in
what was substantially judicial office." Is
Other observers reported with dismay the circus-like aspects of popular elections of judges.14 Many qualified men who would otherwise
grace judicial office cannot bring themselves to run through such a
gamut. Moreover, the gamut continues even for a successful candidate,
for he is no sooner in office than he must envisage the problem of reelection. Inevitably there are consequences, sometimes dire, for the
electorate itself. It is not hard to trace the course of harm from the
candidate to the voters. They would not ask of a judge that he put
away his workpapers to join a three-ring circus for a few months. They
only ask him to do much worse.
In the circus he would need only to please the onlookers, and it is only
they who would pay the price for his antics. In a political contest in
12 See 1 J. BRcE, THE AMERICAN COrNIONWEALTH 511-52 1 (2d rev. ed. 1891). See also
H. LcrIwus, THE TRIAL JUDGE 138 (1937).
13 Pound, Introduction to E. HAYNES, supra note 6, at xiii-xiv.
14 See Laski, The Technique of Judicial Appointment, 24 MIcH. L. REv. 529 (1926);
Leflar, The Quality of Judges, 35 IND. L.J. 289, 299 (1960); Nelson, supra note 11, at 2832. See also Address by Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction With
the Administration of Justice, 1906, in A. VANDERBILT, CASES ON MODERN PROCEDURE
AND JUDLCIAL ADmINIsTRATION 32-49 (1952).
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which he must market the soul he once called his own, it is the public who must pay the price for his blighted independence.'s
There is little cause for continuing to muddle along with so lunatic a
procedure merely because "[b]y luck the populace sometimes gets better than one might expect, or by luck an unlikely choice proves in
time worthy of office." 16
Among the most dire consequences of the popularity contest for
judicial office is the scofflaw spirit it breeds, militating not only against
the bench, but also against the bar and the law itself. Yet the judges
cannot properly march in the streets for reform, and bar associations
have been slow to muster their forces for better courts.
Nevertheless, a glacial force has been gathering momentum against
the slag of years-the force of nationwide legal education, now generally recognized as the best in the world. Young lawyers have come
along who are hospitable to improvement in the judicial process as well
as in substantive law, and recent years have been marked by accelerating progress. Woe unto the state that fails to keep up with such
progress. The quality of that state's justice signifies much to others about
its education and government, and indeed about its future as a distinguished or backward member of the family of states.
Many states have already adopted, or are in the process of adopting,
a merit selection plan derived from the so-called Missouri Plan.' 7 In
one such plan the governor of the state appoints a judge, subject to the
veto of a commission.' 8 In another, the governor makes the appointment from a list submitted by a nominating commission, which in large
part represents the bar.19
15 Traynor, Rising Standards of Courts and Judges: The California Experience, 40
J.

ST. B. CAL. 677, 684 (1965).
16 Traynor, The Unguarded Affairs of the Semikempt Mistress, 113 U. PA. L. REV.
485, 488 (1965).
17 See Allard, Application of the Missouri Court Plan to Judicial Selection and
Ten1ure in America Today, 15 BUFFALO L. REV. 378, 380 (1965); Winters & Allard,
Two Dozen Misconceptions About Judicial Selection and Tenure, 48 J. AM. JUD. Soc'v
138, 144 (1964) ; Variations of the Society's Merit Plan: Judicial Selection and Tenure,
48 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 133 (1964).
18 Since 1934, appointments of appellate court judges in California have been made
by the governor, subject to confirmation by a commission on judicial appointments.
CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 26.
19 Among the states having such a plan are Alaska, Colorado, Iowa, Kansas (supreme
court only), Missouri (appellate courts and certain trial courts) and Nebraska. See
Merit Judicial Selection, Tenure, Discipline and Removal Plans-The Extent of Their
Adoption, 50 J. Am. JUD. Soc'Y 112 (1966).
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The merit selection plans mark a great leap forward from the popular
elections of the long heyday of Willy and Miss Minnie, who unfortunately sometimes turned out to be judges as well as voters. These
plans also mark a great leap forward from patently political appointments. They are more than ever essential now that the number of
judges must be increased to keep up with the population and a prodigious economy.
In California, for example, there are 920 trial court judges, thirtynine intermediate appellate court judges and seven supreme court
justices. During his eight year incumbency from 1958 to 1966 the last
Governor of California made more than 560 judicial appointments. Of
these, eighty-one were made in the last weeks of his tenure-a phenomenon attributable not only to retirements but also to the fact that the
legislature had recently created six new appellate judgeships, six new
superior court judgeships and fifteen new municipal court judgeships
to handle a workload that was taxing many courts beyond reasonable
limits. As one study has noted: "[T]he present power of a California
governor in appointing trial judges exceeds that of the President of the
United States, inasmuch as appointments by the President to the federal
trial court must be confirmed by the Senate." 20
California is moving toward creating a commission on judicial appointments that will nominate all candidates for judicial office. The
power of nomination held by such a commission might well be counterbalanced by giving to any lawyer meeting the constitutional and statutory qualifications the right to apply for appointment and to be considered therefor after investigation.
As to the personnel of the proposed commission, most of us with
an occupational bent would welcome a dominant representation of
judges, reinforced by both law teachers and lawyers in public service
and private practice. I should also welcome some representatives of
the public. They would not be a XWilly or a Miss Minnie who happened to know the governor and little else. The best that one can
postulate are citizens of high enough intelligence to comprehend their
legal colleagues and of wide enough experience to electrify the legal atmosphere with a few insights from the nonlegal world. They could
inaugurate a modern tradition of public service that would do the
Republic proud.
It is not enough to resolve the question of who can best select the
judges. We reach finally the troublesome question of who can best
20 Nelson, supra note 11, at 4.
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judge the judges once they are in office. It is only fair to relate that
question to the federal as well as to the state judges, if we agree with
the public-spirited Virginian, Thomas Jefferson, that everyone in public life should be answerable to someone. 2 1
In determining who that someone should be, we can probably agree
once again to rule out the usual venal or vociferous characters who
would bring the courthouse down with them in their wrath at this
judge or that. The problem of disqualification, whether for incapacity
or for other reasons, is akin to the problem of removing a defective
vessel from a china shop without damaging the sound ones nearby. I
have noted elsewhere that in the judiciary, as in every other walk of
life, a bad man is as hard to lose as a good man is hard to find. 22
In 1960 California pioneered in resolving the problem of the defective vessel by establishing an unsalaried Commission on Judicial
Qualifications, through which the judiciary can police its own ranks. 2 3
The procedure can be summarized briefly. Upon a complaint to the
executive secretary the Commission investigates the allegations. If it
finds them frivolous, it does no more than inform the complainant accordingly. If, however, it encounters a problem of judicial incapacity
or misbehavior, it seeks a voluntary solution, holding in confidence all
proceedings to that end. Such an approach is particularly appropriate
for the painful case where a judge must be made to understand that he
has become physicially or mentally incapacitated. In this regard it is
worth mentioning that voluntary retirement is rendered less painful in
California by a fair pension system. Confidential preliminary proceedings are also appropriate in cases of errant behavior not warranting
removal.
The Commission consists of five judges appointed by the California
Supreme Court from specified lower courts, two lawyers appointed by
the Board of Governors of the California Bar and two laymen appointed
by the governor with the consent of the state senate. This combination
gives the Commission a nonpartisan public character free of public
pressures.
21 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, June 20, 1787, in 2 THlE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 152-53 (H.A. Washington ed. 1853); Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, June 19, 1787, in JEFFERSON's LETTERS 84-85 (W.
Whitman ed. 1940).

22 Traynor, supra note 16, at 504.
28 See CAL. CONST. art. VI, SS lb, 10b; CAL. Gov'T CODE § 68702 (West 1964);
Traynor, supra note 15; Note, Remedies for Judicial Misconduct and Disability: Re.
moval and Discipline of Judges, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 149, 175-84 (1966).
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When the circumstances warrant retirement or removal, and when
the judge refuses to retire or resign voluntarily, the Commission arranges for a hearing. It bears noting that there is a long-established
Judicial Council in California which has formulated rules to ensure
a fair hearing. Once the Commission decides to recommend retirement
or removal, the judge is entitled to a hearing before the California
Supreme Court.
When a bench can quit itself of a burdensome member through such
a commission, it gains as much as the bar and the public. It reaps added
benefits from each judge's quickened awareness that he must meet reasonable standards of competence and behavior in relation to his office.
Moreover, once judges are held responsible to an impartial commission,
there is no longer the vestige of a case for subjecting them to the popular or powerful will of the day.
I would be confident that qualification commissions will gain wide
acceptance, were they not so plainly sensible. As it is, most state judges
and all federal judges still remain free of such rational controls. The
situation is all the worse as to the state judges because most of them
continue to be subject instead to the errant popular will. Should merit
selection commissions on judicial appointments and qualification commissions on incumbent judges ever become widespread for both state
and federal judges, we shall be well on the way to minimum standards of
judicial responsibility.
Lest we now become too zealous about judging the judges, let us
temper criticism with some understanding of the almost insoluble problems they are called upon to resolve, the many constraints within which
they must work, and the constant critical evaluation of their work that
already abounds in legal journals.
The problems that a judge must resolve come from every direction.
The public that heeds only Willy or Miss Minnie has not the slightest
idea of the volume and endless variety of these problems. For all that
many people know there is nothing more to law, and particularly to
criminal law, than the most publicized controversies that make constitutional history. A judge is likely to understand the public's frustration at decisions they do not agree with, for frustration is his daily lot.
Rarely can he move swiftly to a decision with the comfortable assurance of those who feel sure there is only one side to a case. It is his job
to decide how best to keep the law on a rational path between the devil
and the deep blue sea. He may find no more cause for rejoicing than
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his critics do when the law compels him to accord a devil the same
benefits of due process he would accord anyone else. 24 A critic disposed
to hang the judge and his independence might do well to reflect upon
what might then happen if a formidable state turned against him, perhaps without cause, and it was his turn next at the gallows. 2 5
Moreover, as we noted earlier, whatever the far-reaching consequences a decision may have, the judge must still arrive at it within the
narrowest constraints. He must work within the boundaries of the case
before him and with the traditional circumspection imposed upon him
by precedent. Most people today agree that law does, and must, evolve
with the times. Nevertheless, the judge has a responsibility to make
clear and orderly transitions from the past to the present. An appellate
judge who has the last word in the law must account painstakingly for
his decision in an opinion that becomes a public record for all to read
and criticize.
The influence of responsible criticism is constantly at work in the
law, and not solely in the legal journals. Each new precedent, like
every venerable precedent that once also was new, is itself a critical
commentary on some inadequacy in the law. The very term means that
it was once unprecedented, that it has given a notable turn to the endless
evolution of legal rules.
I emphasize the interaction of tradition and criticism in the judicial
process because it goes far to explain why judicial office tends to develop,
even in mediocre men, an approach to the law that is both disciplined
and open-minded, and an objectivity that is the basic element of the
judicial spirit. As you reflect upon the endless problems confronting a
judge, the constraints within which he must work, the constant barrage of responsible critical opinion that comes his way from lawyers,
law teachers and even other judges, you may decide that, everything
considered, he is doing his job reasonably well. You may also decide
to leave criticism to the many responsible critics who are likewise doing
a reasonable job of regularly appraising his work. You may even give
your accolade to judges who refrain from crossing swords with irresponsible vilifiers, less because it might be unbecoming to an officer of
the law than because it might be a distraction from the demanding work
2 4 See

Traynor, The Devils of Due Process in Criminal Detection, Detention and
Trial, 16 CATH. U.L. REV. 1 (1966), 21 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 357 (1966), 33 U. CHm. L.
REV. 657 (1966).
25 See

(1966).

Traynor, Lawbreakers, Courts and Law-Abiders, 31 Mo. L. REv. 181, 200
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of judicial office. Who knows, you may also work for selection plans
that will encourage good men to take judicial office and for qualification
commissions that will ensure continuing responsibility in office. Then
no one will be able to write you, as Thomas Jefferson once wrote to
Peter Carr: "I am much mortified to hear that you have lost so much
time; and that when you arrived in Williamsburg, you were not at all
advanced from what you were when you left Monticello." 26
It is high time to evolve methods for judging our judges properly.
Meanwhile, let us have some understanding of the countless perplexing,
unpublicized cases that are as much a part of a judge's work as the recurring controversies that make constitutional history. They bespeak
the inevitable troubles of a diverse and mobile society as it continues to
grow and prosper. To judges and their critics alike, Virginia, like many
another mother, may still proffer words of perspective: Trouble is
nothing new, my child. Trouble is a condition of life. What counts is
to meet it proudly, with all the sense you can muster.

2 6 Letter

from Thomas Jefferson to Peter Carr, Aug. 19, 1785, in THE BEST LETTERs
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 9 (J. Hamilton ed. 1926).

